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Abstract 
 
This paper aims to analyze the non-neutrality of monetary policy incorporating the 
Lucas (1988) type endogenous growth model in the standard New Keynesian 
macroeconomic model with nominal wage rigidities. It is shown that the monetary 
policy summarized in the level of trend inflation is non-neutral in the long-run 
economic growth in the presence of nominal wage rigidities. The growth-inflation 
nexus depends on the degree of nominal rigidities and the degree of differentiation of 
the labor services.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Since the so-called New Keynesian model has been frequently used in analysis 
of the effects of a monetary policy shock, there has been a certain accumulation 
of investigations in this field. These analyses aim to address the short-run 
non-neutrality of monetary policy and to explain the impulse response functions 
detected in the empirical literature. Nevertheless, there is not yet a sufficient 
stock of investigations with respect to the long-run relationship between the 
trend inflation and the economic growth. As in Galí (2008), the “standard” New 
Keynesian models typically assume zero inflation at the steady state, although 
the majority of the central banks of the developed countries conduct the inflation 
  
targeting policy with a mild positive rate1. This paper aims to fill in this gap and to 
analyze a long-run non-neutrality of monetary policy.  
 
The empirical literature provides some evidences on a non-linear relation 
between inflation and economic growth (among others, Khan and Senhadji, 
2001; López-Villavicencio and Mignon, 2012). Khan and Senhadji (2001) detect 
the threshold effects of inflation on growth, based on a panel econometric model 
that incorporates threshold parameter, with data on 140 countries including both 
developed and developing ones. According to their estimation, there is a 
threshold inflation rate above which inflation significantly slows down the 
economic growth, which is estimated at 1–3 percent for industrial countries and 
11–12 percent for developing countries. In line with Khan and Senhadji, 
López-Villavicencio and Mignon (2012) analyze the threshold effects of inflation 
taking advantage of the Panel Smooth Transition Regression (PSTR) model that 
allows the estimation of threshold effects with a smooth transition to one regime 
to another, or law-inflation regime to high-inflation regime. The estimated 
marginal effect of inflation on growth is, then, smoothed between law-inflation 
and high-inflation regimes. Their estimation results support the findings of Khan 
and Senhadji. That is, the threshold inflation rate differs across developed and 
developing countries, with 1.2 percent for the former and 10-20 percent for the 
latter.  
 
From the theoretical point of view, there is only a few number of precedent 
investigations on this topic: among others, Amano et al. (2009; 2012) and Vaona 
(2012). Both back up the empirical evidences on the non-linear growth-inflation 
nexus. Amano et al. (2012) incorporate the endogenous growth model fueled by 
the expansion of varieties a la Romer (1990) in the New Keynesian model with 
Taylor-type price and wage contracts. Their results show a non-linear concave 
relationship between the trend inflation and the long-run real output growth. 
Under the basic calibration, shifting trend inflation from -5 to 5 percent provokes 
50-point-basis variations in the long-run growth rate. The main channel of this 
                                                   
1
 This targeted inflation rate is typically set at 2 percent with a band of 0.1 percent or so 
around it. Although the ECB (European Central Bank) does not use the term of “inflation 
target”, it sets 2 percent of inflation as the “Definition of Price Stability”. The Bank of Japan 
was an only exception that had not explicitly declared formally a targeted inflation rate. 
However, under the newly selected governor, Haruhiko Kuroda, in January, 2013, the Bank 
has decided to introduce the “Price Stability Target” of 2 percent (http://www.boj.or.jp/ 
en/mopo/outline/sgp.htm/). 
  
effect is the labor supply effect, in which as the trend inflation increases, those 
who can re-optimize their wage try to front-end load it and thereby increase the 
economy’s average wage markup, which in turn decreases availability of 
aggregate labor inputs. Moreover, their basic calibration indicates that the 
optimal trend inflation in a sense that maximizes the long-run growth rate is a 
substantial deflation of 3.15 percent.  
 
On the other hand, Vaona (2012) incorporates the endogenous growth model 
based on knowledge externalities a la Romer (1986) with Taylor-type wage 
rigidities, where firms’ aggregate knowledge is proportional to aggregate capital 
stock and considered as a public good that contributes to increasing production. 
Moreover, unlike the model developed by Amano et al. (2012), money is 
explicitly introduced in the model in a way that real money balances generate 
households’ utility. Under the basic calibration, there is a threshold money 
growth rate around 2 percent, below which an impact of money growth on real 
output growth is slightly positive, while above which an impact falls to negative 
one.  
 
The common features in these models are the followings; first, they put an 
emphasis on the importance of wage rigidities in the long-run growth-inflation 
nexus; and second, both are based on the model of uni-growth engine with 
physical capital accumulation. To the best of our knowledge, there is no literature 
that merges an endogenous growth model that incorporates human capital 
accumulation a la Lucas (1988) in the New Keynesian framework, in order to 
analyze the long-run non-neutrality of monetary policy. However, it would be of 
great importance to consider the human capital accumulation, partly because 
household’s labor supply decision is closely related to its decision on human 
capital accumulation, and partly because the growth-inflation nexus in the 
presence of wage rigidities might be subject to qualitative change under the 
dual-growth engine model with both physical and human capital accumulation.  
 
Based on the above mentioned motivations, this paper aims to analyze the 
long-run growth-inflation nexus, merging the endogenous growth model with 
human capital a la Lucas (1988) with the New Keynesian model with wage 
rigidities, and permitting non-zero trend inflation. The next section provides a 
brief explanation on the model structure. In the third section, the model 
  
properties at the steady state will be analyzed. The fourth section then provides 
analysis on the growth-inflation nexus, and the fifth section concludes.  
 
 
2. The model 
 
The main features of this model are the followings: 
(i) Nominal wage rigidities in the form of Taylor (1980) type wage contracts 
(ii) Endogenous growth model of dual-engine with human capital a la Lucas 
(1988) 
 
There are four main agents in this economy: intermediate goods producer, final 
goods producing retail firms, household, and the Central Bank. Since the interest 
of this paper is in the long-run equilibrium, the monetary policy taken by the 
Central Bank is simply to set the trend inflation. Moreover, there is no money 
introduced in this model, following the “cashless economy” hypothesis 
(Woodford, 2003; Galí, 2008) typically taken in the New Keynesian 
macroeconomic models.  
 
 
2.1. Intermediate goods producer 
 
It is assumed that there is a representative perfectly competitive intermediate 
goods producer with technology given by: 
 
(1)      𝑌𝑡
𝑚 = 𝐴𝐾𝑡
𝛼𝐿𝑡
1−𝛼 
 
where 𝑌𝑡
𝑚 is the output of homogeneous intermediate goods, 𝐴 total factor 
productivity, 𝐾𝑡  stock of physical capital, and 𝐿𝑡  a composite index of 
differentiated labor services measured by effective labor defined as follows: 
 
(2)      𝐿𝑡 = [∫ 𝐿𝑖,𝑡
𝜃−1
𝜃 𝑑𝑖
1
0
]
𝜃
𝜃−1
 
 
where 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 represents differentiated labor service input in terms of effective labor 
  
provided by an individual 𝑖 at time 𝑡, and 𝜃 the elasticity of substitution across 
labor services.  
 
Since the market is perfectly competitive, the intermediate goods producer’s 
profit maximization problem is: 
 
(3)      max
𝐾𝑡,𝐿𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝐴𝐾𝑡
𝛼𝐿𝑡
1−𝛼 − ∫ 𝑊𝑖,𝑡𝐿𝑖,𝑡𝑑𝑖
1
0
− 𝑅𝑡𝑃𝑡𝐾𝑡 
 
where 𝑃𝑡
𝑚 is the market price of intermediate goods, 𝑊𝑖,𝑡 the nominal wage 
rate, and 𝑅𝑡 the rental price of physical capital. The first order condition implies 
that the value of marginal productivity of physical capital equals to marginal cost: 
 
(4)      𝛼𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝐴𝐾𝑡
𝛼−1𝐿𝑡
1−𝛼 = 𝑅𝑡𝑃𝑡 
 
On the other hand, the demand for differentiated labor service 𝑖 is obtained as 
follows: 
 
(5)      𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = [(1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝐾𝑡
𝛼]𝜃 (
𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑡
𝑚 )
−𝜃
𝐿𝑡
1−𝜃𝛼 
 
Imposing the definition of a composite index of differentiated labor services, we 
get the aggregated demand for labor as follows: 
 
(6)      𝐿𝑡 = [
(1 − 𝛼)𝐴
𝑤𝑎,𝑡̃
]
1
𝛼
𝐾𝑡 
 
where 𝑤𝑎,𝑡̃  represents the wage dispersion in terms of intermediate goods price 
given by: 
 
(7)      𝑤𝑎,𝑡̃ = [∫ (
𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑡
𝑚 )
1−𝜃
𝑑𝑖
1
0
]
1
1−𝜃
 
 
 
  
2.2. Final goods producing retail firms 
 
There is an infinite number of retail firms over a continuum of [0,1], which 
repackage the homogeneous intermediate goods and sell them to the household. 
It is assumed that they have the same simplified production technology that 
converts one unit of homogeneous intermediate goods into one unit of 
differentiated final goods. The retail firms have a market power in the goods 
market so that they can set the own price facing the downward-sloping demand 
for each variety. Unlike the standard New Keynesian model, this model does not 
assume the price rigidities in the final goods market nor in the intermediate 
goods market. Then, the profit maximization problem of the retail firms is given 
by: 
 
(8)      max
𝑃𝑗,𝑡
∗
(𝑃𝑗,𝑡
∗ − 𝑃𝑡
𝑚)𝐶𝑗,𝑡(𝑃𝑗,𝑡
∗ ) 
 
where 𝐶𝑗,𝑡(𝑃𝑗,𝑡
∗ ) represents the demand for each variety of final goods. As in the 
standard New Keynesian model, the representative household consumes a 
composite index of a continuum of differentiated final products over the range of 
[0, 1], defined as: 
 
(9)      𝐶𝑡 = [∫ 𝐶𝑗,𝑡
𝜀−1
𝜀 𝑑𝑗
1
0
]
𝜀
𝜀−1
 
 
where 𝜀 is the elasticity of substitution across the different varieties. Therefore, 
the demand for each variety is given by: 
 
(10)      𝐶𝑗,𝑡(𝑃𝑗,𝑡
∗ ) = (
𝑃𝑗,𝑡
∗
𝑃𝑡
)
−𝜀
𝐶𝑡 
 
The first order condition implies the standard pricing rule for monopolistically 
competitive market: 
 
(11)      𝑃𝑗,𝑡
∗ = (
𝜀
𝜀 − 1
) 𝑃𝑡
𝑚 
  
 
Due to the symmetric equilibrium, the aggregate price will be determined by the 
intermediate good price times a mark-up, as follows: 
 
(12)      𝑃𝑡 = [∫ 𝑃𝑗,𝑡
∗ 1−𝜀
1
0
]
1
1−𝜀
= (
𝜀
𝜀 − 1
) 𝑃𝑡
𝑚 
 
Using this relation on the aggregate price, the economy’s real wage dispersion is 
given by: 
 
(13)      𝑤𝑎,𝑡 = [∫ (
𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑡
)
1−𝜃
𝑑𝑖
1
0
]
1
1−𝜃
= (
𝜀 − 1
𝜀
) 𝑤𝑎,𝑡̃  
 
Then, the intermediate goods producer’s optimal conditions can be rewritten as 
follows: 
 
(14)      𝐿𝑡 = [(
𝜀 − 1
𝜀
)
(1 − 𝛼)𝐴
𝑤𝑎,𝑡
]
1
𝛼
𝐾𝑡 
(15)      𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 [𝐴 (
𝜀 − 1
𝜀
)]
1
𝛼
[
1 − 𝛼
𝑤𝑎,𝑡
]
1−𝛼
𝛼
 
 
 
2.3. Household 
 
2.3.1. Basic settings 
 
For simplicity, it is assumed that there is a multi-agent, infinitely lived 
representative household. The household consists of a continuum of members 
𝑖 (𝑖 ∈ [0, 1]) across which decisions on the effective labor supply and human 
capital accumulation can vary. However, as mentioned earlier, the representative 
household collectively consumes a composite index of differentiated final 
products, invests in physical capital and rent it to the intermediate goods 
  
producer.  
 
In the labor market, each member supplies differentiated labor service to the 
intermediate goods producers. Each of them possesses market power to set its 
own wage rate facing downward-sloping labor demand, but it cannot affect the 
average wage rate of the economy. That is, the lobar market is monopolistically 
competitive. Moreover, as in the previous literature (Amano et al., 2012; Vaona, 
2012), it is assumed that the labor market exhibits the Taylor (1980) type 
nominal rigidities. Each individual is supposed to make a contract which is valid 
for the next 𝐼 periods. Obviously, 𝐼 is a parameter for the nominal rigidities. 
 
In order to supply the demanded amount of effective labor, individuals are 
supposed to make two decisions2. First, as in the Lucas model, each member of 
household chooses a fraction of time devoted to the production activity, 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
(𝑢𝑖,𝑡 ∈ [0,1]) and a fraction to human capital accumulation, 1 − 𝑢𝑖,𝑡. Second, 
each individual also chooses the total time dedicated to non-leisure activities, 
that is, production activity plus accumulation of human capital, 𝑁𝑖,𝑡3. Therefore, 
the effective labor is defined as follows: 
 
(15)      𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖,𝑡𝑁𝑖,𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 
 
It is assumed that the human capital accumulation has a following technology: 
 
(16)      ℎ𝑖,𝑡+1 = [1 + 𝜉(1 − 𝑢𝑖,𝑡)𝑁𝑖,𝑡]ℎ𝑖,𝑡 
 
where 𝜉 is a productivity parameter of human capital accumulation. The law of 
motion for the economy’s total human capital is then given by: 
 
                                                   
2
 As explained later, this assumption will be replaced by the Assumption (i) and (ii) in the 
Appendix I, due to the contradiction which exist in the first order condition for 𝑢𝑖,𝑡+𝜏. 
3
 Given a certain level of wage rate, we can observe two types of trade-offs in the selection 
of 𝑁𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 and 𝑢𝑖,𝑡+𝜏. First, since the total time spent for non-leisure activities generate 
disutility, there is a trade-off between a decrease in disutility today and an increase in current 
or future income flows by devoting to production activity or accumulating human capital. This 
is the trade-off in the selection of 𝑁𝑖,𝑡+𝜏. Second, another trade-off lies between an increase 
in time dedicated to production which results in higher disposal income today and an 
increase in the income flows in the future through human capital accumulation today. This is 
the trade-off with respect to the selection of 𝑢𝑖,𝑡+𝜏. 
  
(17)      ℎ𝑡+1 = ∫ ℎ𝑖,𝑡+1𝑑𝑖
1
0
= {∫ [1 + 𝜉(1 − 𝑢𝑖,𝑡)𝑁𝑖,𝑡]
ℎ𝑖,𝑡
ℎ𝑡
1
0
} ℎ𝑡 
 
Finally, as in Christiano et al.(2005), the representative household holds a stock 
of physical capital, rents it to the intermediate goods producers, and decides 
how much physical capital to accumulate. For simplicity, it is assumed that there 
are neither adjustment costs nor flow adjustment costs of investment. Then, the 
law of motion of physical capital is given as follows: 
 
(18)      𝐾𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡 
 
where 𝛿 represents a depreciation rate of physical capital. 
 
 
2.3.2. Optimal decisions 
 
Now, remember that the only rigidity lies in the nominal wage of differentiated 
labor services and the representative household can flexibly decide optimal 
trajectory of all the variables other than the wage rate offer. Then, the decision of 
household can be divided into two stages. First, each member of household 
decides the optimal wage rate, considering the trade-off that lies among (i) an 
increase in the unit income of efficient labor, (ii) a decrease in the demand for 
efficient labor, and (iii) a decrease in disutilities generated by non-leisure 
activities. The last factor enters in the trade-off by imposing the market-clearing 
for labor market. Second, given the trajectory of wage rate offer, and therefore 
that of demand for effective labor over time, the representative household 
chooses the consumption, the time dedicated to non-leisure activities, and its 
fraction for production activity. Then, from the law of motion of physical capital 
and that of human capital, we will get the trajectory for all the variables. As 
shown below, these trajectories are obtained by solving the optimal control 
problem.  
 
2.3.2.1. Optimal wage setting rule 
In the first stage, the representative household maximizes its expected present 
value of utility over the contract period of the individual 𝑖’s contract made at time 
𝑡, choosing its optimal wage offer: 
  
(19)      max
𝑊𝑖,𝑡
∗
𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽
𝜏 [log(𝐶𝑡+𝜏) −
1
1 + 𝜈
∫ (𝑁𝑖,𝑡+𝜏)
1+𝜈
𝑑𝑖
1
0
]
𝐼−1
𝜏=0
 
 
The restrictions are given by (5), (12) and the following equations: 
(20)      𝐶𝑡+𝜏 + 𝐾𝑡+𝜏+1 = D𝑡+𝜏 + ∫ (
𝑊𝑖,𝑡
∗
𝑃𝑡+𝜏
) 𝐿𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 (
𝑊𝑖,𝑡
∗
𝑃𝑡+𝜏
𝑚 ) 𝑑𝑖
1
0
+ (1 + 𝑅𝑡+𝜏 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡+𝜏 
(21)      𝐿𝑖,𝑡+𝜏(𝑊𝑖,𝑡
∗ ) = 𝑢𝑖,𝑡+𝜏𝑁𝑖,𝑡+𝜏ℎ𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 
 
where D𝑡+𝜏 indicates dividends. The first order condition implies the following 
wage rate setting rule: 
 
(22)      𝑊𝑡
∗ = (
𝜃
𝜃 − 1
)
𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽
𝜏𝑃𝑡+𝜏
𝜃 𝐾𝑡+𝜏
𝜃𝛼 𝐿𝑡+𝜏
1−𝜃𝛼𝑁𝑖,𝑡+𝜏
𝜐 (𝑢𝑖,𝑡+𝜏ℎ𝑖,𝑡+𝜏)
−1𝐼−1
𝜏=0
𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽𝜏𝐶𝑡+𝜏
−1 𝑃𝑡+𝜏
𝜃−1𝐾𝑡+𝜏
𝜃𝛼 𝐿𝑡+𝜏
1−𝜃𝛼𝐼−1
𝜏=0
 
 
Note that in case of no nominal rigidities in wage, the wage rule becomes a 
simple one that imposes an ordinary mark-up, 𝜃/(𝜃 − 1), on the competitive 
wage rate, which makes equalized the marginal utility through an increase in 
consumption and the marginal disutility generated by an increase in non-leisure 
activities. 
 
2.3.2.2. Optimal control problem 
Now, given the optimal trajectory of nominal wage of each individual, we can 
solve the representative household’s optimal control problem, with the following 
objective function: 
 
(23)      𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽
𝜏 [log(𝐶𝑡+𝜏) −
1
1 + 𝜈
∫ (𝑁𝑖,𝑡+𝜏)
1+𝜈
𝑑𝑖
1
0
]
∞
𝜏=0
 
 
subject to (5), (12), (14), (17), (18), (20), (21) and (22). The first order conditions 
imply the following relations (refer to the Appendix 1 for details): 
 
  
(24)      
𝛽
𝐶𝑡+𝜏+1 𝐶𝑡+𝜏⁄
= (1 + 𝛿) − [𝐴 (
𝜀 − 1
𝜀
)]
1
𝛼
(
1 − 𝛼
𝑤𝑎,𝑡
)
1−𝛼
𝛼
 
(25)      𝜉𝑁𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 [
(𝑊𝑖,𝑡+𝜏
∗ 𝑃𝑡+𝜏⁄ )
?̅?𝑡+𝜏
𝑢𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 + (1 − 𝑢𝑖,𝑡+𝜏)] = 1 − (
𝛽
𝐶𝑡+𝜏+1 𝐶𝑡+𝜏⁄
) (
?̅?𝑡+𝜏+1
?̅?𝑡+𝜏
) 
 
where ?̅?𝑡+𝜏 represents economy’s average real wage given by: 
 
?̅?𝑡+𝜏 = ∫
𝑊𝑖,𝑡+𝜏
∗
𝑃𝑡+𝜏
𝑑𝑖
1
0
 
 
As explained in the Appendix 1, these relations can be obtained by taking the 
assumption that the representative household aims to adjust 𝑢𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 in a way that 
(A3) will be satisfied for the average real wage of the economy.  
 
 
3. Steady State 
 
3.1. BGP growth 
 
In this section, several properties of the steady state will be analyzed. First of all, 
from the intermediate production function, the intermediate output, the physical 
capital and the effective labor grow at the same rate at the steady state. Since 
the final product market has the symmetric equilibrium, it is deduced that the 
intermediate output and a final output composite index coincide, 𝑌 = 𝑌𝑚. Letting 
𝑔(. ) be the growth rate of a variable at the steady state, the steady state of this 
economy implies the following BGP (Balanced Growth Path) relations: 
 
(26)      𝑔(𝑌) = 𝑔(𝑌𝑚) = 𝑔(𝐾) = 𝑔(𝐿) 
 
It also implies that the steady state output to physical capital ratio is constant. 
From the homogeneous of degree one Cobb-Douglas production function of 
intermediate goods, we get the following output to physical capital ratio: 
 
  
(27)      
𝑌
𝐾
= (
𝜀
𝜀 − 1
)
𝑅𝑡
𝛼
= 𝐴
1
𝛼 [(
𝜀 − 1
𝜀
)
1 − 𝛼
𝑤𝑎,𝑡
]
1−𝛼
𝛼
 
 
On the other hand, from the market clearing condition of the final goods market, 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡 , the steady state consumption to physical capital ratio, 𝐶/𝐾 , is 
determined as follows: 
 
(28)      
𝐶
𝐾
=
𝑌
𝐾
− 𝑔(𝐾) − 𝛿 
 
Since the right-hand side is constant over time, consumption and capital grow at 
the same rate, and therefore: 
 
(29)      
𝐶
𝐾
= 𝐴
1
𝛼 [(
𝜀 − 1
𝜀
)
1 − 𝛼
𝑤𝑎,𝑡
]
1−𝛼
𝛼
− 𝑔(𝐶) − 𝛿 
(30)      𝑔(𝑌) = 𝑔(𝑌𝑚) = 𝑔(𝐾) = 𝑔(𝐿) = 𝑔(𝐶) 
 
 
3.2. The wage rule and non-leisure activities 
 
Unlike the model developed by Amano et al. (2012), the re-optimized real wage 
should be constant at the steady state since the nominal wage is expressed in 
terms of effective labor. Therefore, the steady state average real wage, ?̅?𝑡, and 
the real wage dispersion, 𝑤𝑎,𝑡, are also constant and can be expressed in terms 
of the re-optimized real wage. Letting the re-optimized real wage at the steady 
state be written with a notation of (𝑊𝑡
∗∗ 𝑃𝑡⁄ ) in order to distinguish it from the 
optimal trajectory of the real wage for each individual, and assuming that 
members of the representative household are uniformly distributed across 𝐼 
cohorts, the steady state average real wage and the real wage dispersion can be 
expressed as follows: 
 
(31)      ?̅? =
𝑊𝑡
∗∗
𝑃𝑡
[
1
𝐼
∑ (
1
Π
)
𝜏𝐼−1
𝜏=0
] 
  
(32)      𝑤𝑎 =
𝑊𝑡
∗∗
𝑃𝑡
[
1
𝐼
∑ (
1
Π
)
(1−𝜃)𝜏𝐼−1
𝜏=0
]
1
1−𝜃
 
 
where Π is the gross trend inflation decided by the Central Bank (i.e. one plus 
trend inflation rate). 
 
From (31) and the Assumption (ii) in the Appendix 1, (A9) can be rewritten as 
follows, from which it is deduced that the time dedicated to non-leisure 
activities, 𝑁𝑖,𝑡+𝜏, is constant across the time and individuals: 
 
(33)      𝜆2,𝑡+𝜏+1 − 𝜆2,𝑡+𝜏 = −𝜆2,𝑡+𝜏 𝜉𝑁𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 = −𝜆2,𝑡+𝜏 𝜉𝑁𝑠𝑠 
 
Then, (A10) can be simplified as follows: 
 
(34)      𝜉𝑁𝑠𝑠 = 1 −
𝛽
1 + 𝑔(𝐶)
 
 
On the other hand, from (22), we obtain the following expression of re-optimized 
wage rule at the steady state (refer to the Appendix 2 for details): 
 
(35)      (
𝑊𝑡
∗∗
𝑃𝑡
)
1−𝜃
= (
𝜃
𝜃 − 1
) [(
𝜀
𝜀 − 1
)
𝑤𝑎
1−𝛼𝜃
(1 − 𝛼)𝐴
]
1
𝛼
(
𝐶
𝐾
) [
𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽
𝜏𝐼−1
𝜏=0
𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽𝜏Π
(𝜃−1)𝜏𝐼−1
𝜏=0
] 𝑁𝑠𝑠
1+𝜐 
 
Note that the nominal re-optimized wage will grow at the same rate as the trend 
inflation. It implies that, at the individual level, nominal wage is fixed during the 
contract period and then jumps at the rate of Π𝐼  at the next re-optimizing 
opportunity.  
 
 
3.3. Steady state system of equations 
 
Finally, the steady state system of equations, which is characterized with 5 
unknowns: 𝑊𝑡
∗∗ 𝑃𝑡⁄ , 𝑤𝑎, 𝐶 𝐾⁄ , 𝑔(𝐶) and 𝑁𝑠𝑠, is given as follows: 
 
  
(S1)      (
𝑊𝑡
∗∗
𝑃𝑡
)
1−𝜃
= (
𝜃
𝜃 − 1
) [(
𝜀
𝜀 − 1
)
𝑤𝑎
1−𝛼𝜃
(1 − 𝛼)𝐴
]
1
𝛼
(
𝐶
𝐾
) [
𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽
𝜏𝐼−1
𝜏=0
𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽𝜏Π
(𝜃−1)𝜏𝐼−1
𝜏=0
] 𝑁𝑠𝑠
1+𝜐 
(S2)      𝑤𝑎 =
𝑊𝑡
∗∗
𝑃𝑡
[
1
𝐼
∑ (
1
Π
)
(1−𝜃)𝜏𝐼−1
𝜏=0
]
1
1−𝜃
 
(S3)      
𝐶
𝐾
= 𝐴
1
𝛼 [(
𝜀 − 1
𝜀
)
1 − 𝛼
𝑤𝑎
]
1−𝛼
𝛼
− 𝑔(𝐶) − 𝛿 
(S4)      1 + 𝑔(𝐶) =
𝛽
(1 + 𝛿) − [𝐴 (
𝜀 − 1
𝜀 )]
1
𝛼
(
1 − 𝛼
𝑤𝑎
)
1−𝛼
𝛼
 
(S5)      𝜉𝑁𝑠𝑠 = 1 −
𝛽
1 + 𝑔(𝐶)
 
 
 
4. Analysis of growth-inflation nexus 
 
4.1. Growth-inflation nexus in the presence of nominal rigidities 
 
For simplicity, suppose that there is no depreciation of the physical capital, that is, 
𝛿 = 0. Operating the steady state system of equations, we can obtain the 
following two representative expressions: 
 
(36)      (1 − 𝛼)Λ = (
𝜃
𝜃 − 1
) Θ1−𝜃B [(
𝜀
𝜀 − 1
) Λ + 1 −
𝛽
1 − Λ
] (
Λ
𝜉
)
1+𝑣
 
(37)      1 + 𝑔(𝐶) =
𝛽
1 − Λ
 
 
where  
Λ ≡ [𝐴 (
𝜀 − 1
𝜀
)]
1
𝛼
(
1 − 𝛼
𝑤𝑎
)
1−𝛼
𝛼
 
Θ = [
1
𝐼
∑ (
1
Π
)
(1−𝜃)𝜏𝐼−1
𝜏=0
]
1
1−𝜃
 
  
B = [
𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽
𝜏𝐼−1
𝜏=0
𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽𝜏Π
(𝜃−1)𝜏𝐼−1
𝜏=0
] 
 
The first derivative of (37) with respect to Λ implies that an increase in Λ 
causes a higher steady state growth rate as follows: 
 
(38)      
𝑑𝑔(𝐶)
𝑑Λ
=
𝛽
(1 − Λ)2
> 0 
 
Now, taking the first derivative of (36) with respect to the gross trend inflation, Π, 
we can obtain the following relation: 
 
(39)      
𝑑Λ
𝑑Π
=
(
𝜃 − 1
Θ )
𝑑Θ
𝑑Π −
1
B
𝑑B
𝑑Π
[(
𝜀
𝜀 − 1 −
𝛽
(1 − Λ)2
)
𝐾
𝐶 +
𝑣
Λ]
 
 
where 
𝑑Θ
𝑑Π
= − (
Θ𝜃
𝐼
) [∑ 𝜏Π(𝜃−1)𝜏−1
𝐼−1
𝜏=0
] < 0 
𝑑B
𝑑Π
= − (
B(𝜃 − 1)
∑ 𝛽𝜏Π(𝜃−1)𝜏𝐼−1𝜏=0
) [∑ 𝛽𝜏Π(𝜃−1)𝜏−1
𝐼−1
𝜏=0
] < 0 
 
For a combination of the parameters that generates rational steady state growth 
rate, the denominator is supposedly positive. Then, the sign of 𝑑Λ/𝑑Π depends 
on the sign of numerator. Note that the parameters that affect the numerator are 
𝐼, 𝜃, and 𝛽.  Figure 1 shows the variations of the numerator of (39) with 
respect to different trend inflation rates, assuming that 𝛽 = 0.99 and 𝐼 = 8. The 
main observations are the followings: first, for higher values of 𝜃, there is a 
threshold below and above which the sign of numerator changes; second, this 
threshold lies in deflation area but gets closer to the zero inflation as the 
parameter of elasticity of substitution across differentiated labor services gets 
larger.  
 
  
 
Figure 1. Variations of the numerator and the elasticity of substitution of 
differentiated labor services (𝛽 = 0.99 and 𝐼 = 8) 
 
 
Figure 2. Variations of the numerator and the rigidities parameter 
(𝛽 = 0.99 and 𝜃 = 20) 
-300
-250
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
0
.9
5
0
.9
6
0
.9
7
0
.9
8
0
.9
9
1
.0
0
1
.0
1
1
.0
2
1
.0
3
1
.0
4
1
.0
5
1
.0
6
1
.0
7
1
.0
8
1
.0
9
1
.1
0
θ=2 θ=10 θ=20 θ=50
Gross trend inflation rate
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
0
.9
5
0
.9
6
0
.9
7
0
.9
8
0
.9
9
1
.0
0
1
.0
1
1
.0
2
1
.0
3
1
.0
4
1
.0
5
1
.0
6
1
.0
7
1
.0
8
1
.0
9
1
.1
0
I=2 I=4 I=6 I=8
Gross trend inflation rate
  
 
On the other hand, Figure 2 shows the variations of the numerator of (39) with 
respect to different trend inflation rates, assuming that 𝛽 = 0.99 and 𝜃 = 20. 
The main observations here are the followings: first, there is a threshold below 
and above which the sign of numerator changes for higher nominal rigidities; 
second, this threshold again lies in deflation area but gets closer to the zero 
inflation as the nominal rigidities get smaller.  
 
 
4.2. The main channel of growth-inflation nexus 
 
Finally, for the sake of comparative analysis, let us see the base line case when 
there are no nominal wage rigidities, that is, 𝐼 = 1. Since each individual can 
re-optimize its wage every period, there would be no real wage dispersion, and 
therefore the steady state equations of (S1) and (S2) will be modified as follows: 
 
(
𝑊𝑡
∗∗
𝑃𝑡
)
𝛼−1
𝛼
= (
𝜃
𝜃 − 1
) [(
𝜀
𝜀 − 1
)
1
(1 − 𝛼)𝐴
]
1
𝛼
(
𝐶
𝐾
) 𝑁𝑠𝑠
1+𝜐 
𝑤𝑎 =
𝑊𝑡
∗∗
𝑃𝑡
 
 
Since all the variations in Λ in (39) are attributed to the variations in the real 
wage dispersion, under the flexible wage condition, the trend inflation will not 
affect the steady state economic growth. Therefore, the long-run non-neutrality 
of the monetary policy appears only in the presence of nominal rigidities in 
wages.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, the Lucas type endogenous growth model is incorporated in the 
New Keynesian model with nominal wage rigidities. In line with the previous 
studies by Vaona (2012) and Amano et al. (2012), it is confirmed that, even in 
the model of dual-growth engine with the accumulation of human and physical 
capital, the monetary policy summarized in the trend inflation rate set by the 
  
Central Bank is non-neutral in the long-run economic growth due to the presence 
of nominal wage rigidities. In other words, the trend inflation rate will affect the 
steady state economic growth through the variations in the real wage dispersion 
across individuals. In case of high nominal rigidities and highly differentiated 
labor market, there seems to be a threshold inflation rate, below and above 
which the sign of the effect of trend inflation on growth changes, in such a way 
that the marginal effect of increasing trend inflation is slightly positive below the 
threshold, while it becomes significantly negative above that. This threshold 
typically lies in the deflation area, which is consistent with Amano et al. (2012).  
 
However, it should be noted that the above-mentioned form of growth-inflation 
nexus highly depends on the Assumption (i) and (ii) described in the Appendix 1. 
It might be the case that the selection of the total time dedicated to non-leisure 
activities and its fraction of production activity at the individual level might be 
different from this assumption. More sophisticated mechanism of determination 
of these variables is subject to future investigation.  
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Appendix 1. Optimal control problem of the household 
 
The Hamiltonian for this problem is: 
 
𝐻𝑡+𝜏 = 𝛽
𝜏 [log(𝐶𝑡+𝜏) −
1
1 + 𝜈
∫ (𝑁𝑖,𝑡+𝜏)
1+𝜈
𝑑𝑖
1
0
] 
+𝜆1,𝑡+𝜏 [D𝑡+𝜏 + ∫ (
𝑊𝑖,𝑡+𝜏
∗
𝑃𝑡+𝜏
) 𝐿𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 (
𝑊𝑖,𝑡+𝜏
∗
𝑃𝑡+𝜏
𝑚 ) 𝑑𝑖
1
0
+ (𝑟𝑡+𝜏 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡+𝜏 − 𝐶𝑡+𝜏] 
+𝜆2,𝑡+𝜏 {∫ 𝜉(1 − 𝑢𝑖,𝑡+𝜏)𝑁𝑖,𝑡+𝜏ℎ𝑖,𝑡+𝜏
1
0
} 
 
subject to (5), (12), (14), (17), (18), (20), (21) and (22). The first order conditions 
are given as follows: 
 
(A1)    
𝛽𝜏
𝐶𝑡+𝜏
= 𝜆1,𝑡+𝜏 
(A2)    𝛽𝜏𝑁𝑖,𝑡+𝜏
𝜐 = 𝜆1,𝑡+𝜏 (
𝑊𝑖,𝑡+𝜏
∗
𝑃𝑡+𝜏
) 𝑢𝑖,𝑡+𝜏ℎ𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 + 𝜆2,𝑡+𝜏𝜉(1 − 𝑢𝑖,𝑡+𝜏)ℎ𝑖,𝑡+𝜏    ∀𝑖 ∈ [0,1] 
(A3)    𝜆2,𝑡+𝜏 =
𝜆1,𝑡+𝜏
𝜉
𝑊𝑖,𝑡+𝜏
∗
𝑃𝑡+𝜏
    ∀𝑖 ∈ [0,1] 
(A4)    𝜆1,𝑡+𝜏+1 − 𝜆1,𝑡+𝜏 = −𝜆1,𝑡+𝜏(𝑟𝑡+𝜏 − 𝛿) − 𝜆1,𝑡+𝜏 ∫ (
𝑊𝑖,𝑡+𝜏
∗
𝑃𝑡+𝜏
) (
𝑊𝑖,𝑡+𝜏
∗
𝑃𝑡+𝜏
𝑚 )
−𝜃
[
(1 − 𝛼)𝐴
?̃?𝑎,𝑡+𝜏
1−𝜃𝛼
]
1
𝛼
𝑑𝑖
1
0
 
(A5)    𝜆2,𝑡+𝜏+1 − 𝜆2,𝑡+𝜏 = −𝜆1,𝑡+𝜏 (
𝑊𝑖,𝑡+𝜏
∗
𝑃𝑡+𝜏
) 𝑢𝑖,𝑡+𝜏𝑁𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 − 𝜆2,𝑡+𝜏 𝜉(1 − 𝑢𝑖,𝑡+𝜏)𝑁𝑖,𝑡+𝜏   ∀𝑖 ∈ [0,1] 
(A6)    𝐾𝑡+𝜏+1 = D𝑡+𝜏 + ∫ (
𝑊𝑖,𝑡+𝜏
∗
𝑃𝑡+𝜏
) 𝐿𝑖,𝑡+𝜏(𝑊𝑖,𝑡+𝜏
∗ )𝑑𝑖
1
0
+ (1 + 𝑟𝑡+𝜏 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡+𝜏 − 𝐶𝑡+𝜏 
(A7)    ℎ𝑡+𝜏+1 = {∫ [1 + 𝜉(1 − 𝑢𝑖,𝑡+𝜏)𝑁𝑖,𝑡+𝜏]
ℎ𝑖,𝑡+𝜏
ℎ𝑡+𝜏
1
0
𝑑𝑖} ℎ𝑡+𝜏 
 
Note that the first order condition for 𝑢𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 in (A3) implies that the real wage at 
time 𝑡 + 𝜏 has to be the same across all individuals. However, since the nominal 
wage is expressed in terms of effective labor, the re-optimized real wage should 
be constant at the steady state, and therefore the nominal re-optimized wage 
grows at the same rate as the aggregate price. It implies that when the trend 
inflation is different from zero, there will be variations in the real wage across 
  
individuals. Obviously, it contradicts (A3). 
 
In order to solve this problem, the following assumption is taken: 
 
Assumption (i): In the presence of nominal wage rigidites, the condition (A3) 
can be interpreted as optimality reference in a way that closer to (A3) the 
trade-off for each individual by marginally increasing 𝑢𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 is, the better off 
the representative household will be in terms of utility. The representative 
household then aims to adjust 𝑢𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 for each individual in order to minimize 
the squared sum of each individual’s distance from the optimal reference 
(A3)4. It is equivalent to say that (A3) is satisfied for the economy’s average 
real wage, which is defined as a simple integral of each individual’s real 
wage. Therefore, (A3) should be modified to the following condition: 
 
(A3′)      𝜆2,𝑡+𝜏 =
𝜆1,𝑡+𝜏
𝜉
?̅?𝑡+𝜏 =
𝜆1,𝑡+𝜏
𝜉
∫
𝑊𝑖,𝑡+𝜏
∗
𝑃𝑡+𝜏
𝑑𝑖
1
0
 
 
Assumption (ii): The distribution of the total time dedicated to production 
activity, 𝑢𝑖,𝑡+𝜏𝑁𝑖,𝑡+𝜏, across individuals is proportionate to the distribution of 
real wage for each individual, 𝑊𝑖,𝑡+𝜏
∗ 𝑃𝑡+𝜏⁄ .  
 
Now, substituting (A1) in (A4), we obtain: 
 
1 − (
𝛽
𝐶𝑡+𝜏+1 𝐶𝑡+𝜏⁄
) = [
(1 − 𝛼)𝐴
𝑤𝑎,𝑡̃
1−𝜃𝛼
]
1
𝛼
∫ (
𝑊𝑖,𝑡+𝜏
∗
𝑃𝑡+𝜏
) (
𝑊𝑖,𝑡+𝜏
∗
𝑃𝑡+𝜏
𝑚 )
−𝜃
𝑑𝑖
1
0
+ (𝑟𝑡+𝜏 − 𝛿) 
 
Then, substituting the real rental price and the relations on the aggregate price 
and on the average real wage ((12) and (15)), we will obtain: 
 
(A8)      
𝛽
𝐶𝑡+𝜏+1 𝐶𝑡+𝜏⁄
= (1 + 𝛿) − [𝐴 (
𝜀 − 1
𝜀
)]
1
𝛼
(
1 − 𝛼
𝑤𝑎,𝑡
)
1−𝛼
𝛼
 
 
                                                   
4
 It would be possible to define that each one’s distance from optimal reference as 
|𝜆2,𝑡+𝜏 −
𝜆1,𝑡+𝜏
𝜉
𝑊𝑖,𝑡+𝜏
∗
𝑃𝑡+𝜏
|. 
  
From (A3’) and (A5): 
 
(A9)      𝜆2,𝑡+𝜏+1 − 𝜆2,𝑡+𝜏 = −𝜆2,𝑡+𝜏 𝜉𝑁𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 [
(𝑊𝑖,𝑡+𝜏
∗ 𝑃𝑡+𝜏⁄ )
?̅?𝑡+𝜏
𝑢𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 + (1 − 𝑢𝑖,𝑡+𝜏)]   ∀𝑖 ∈ [0,1] 
 
On the other hand, from (A1) and (A3’), we obtain: 
 
(A10)      
𝜆2,𝑡+𝜏+1
𝜆2,𝑡+𝜏
− 1 =
𝜆1,𝑡+𝜏+1
𝜆1,𝑡+𝜏
?̅?𝑡+𝜏+1
?̅?𝑡+𝜏
− 1 =
𝛽
𝐶𝑡+𝜏+1 𝐶𝑡+𝜏⁄
(
?̅?𝑡+𝜏+1
?̅?𝑡+𝜏
) − 1 
 
 
Then, (A9) and (A10) imply the following relation: 
 
(A11)      𝜉𝑁𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 [
(𝑊𝑖,𝑡+𝜏
∗ 𝑃𝑡+𝜏⁄ )
?̅?𝑡+𝜏
𝑢𝑖,𝑡+𝜏 + (1 − 𝑢𝑖,𝑡+𝜏)] = 1 − (
𝛽
𝐶𝑡+𝜏+1 𝐶𝑡+𝜏⁄
) (
?̅?𝑡+𝜏+1
?̅?𝑡+𝜏
) 
 
 
  
  
Appendix 2. Steady state wage rule 
 
First of all, combining the definition of efficient labor together with the demand for 
labor services (15), we will obtain the following equation: 
 
(A12)      (𝑢𝑖,𝑡+𝜏ℎ𝑖,𝑡+𝜏)
−1
= 𝑁𝑖,𝑡+𝜏[(1 − 𝑎)𝐴𝐾𝑡+𝜏
𝛼]−𝜃 (
𝑊𝑖,𝑡
∗
𝑃𝑡+𝜏
𝑚 )
𝜃
𝐿𝑡+𝜏
𝜃𝛼−1 
 
Substituting (A12) in the optimal wage rule given by (22), we get: 
 
𝑊𝑡
∗1−𝜃 = (
𝜃
𝜃 − 1
) [(
𝜀 − 1
𝜀
)
1
(1 − 𝛼)𝐴
]
𝜃 𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽
𝜏𝑁𝑖,𝑡+𝜏
1+𝜐𝐼−1
𝜏=0
𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽𝜏𝐶𝑡+𝜏
−1 𝑃𝑡+𝜏
𝜃−1𝐾𝑡+𝜏
𝜃𝛼 𝐿𝑡+𝜏
1−𝜃𝛼𝐼−1
𝜏=0
 
 
Substituting the aggregate labor demand (14),  
 
𝑊𝑡
∗1−𝜃 = (
𝜃
𝜃 − 1
) [(
𝜀 − 1
𝜀
)
1
(1 − 𝛼)𝐴
]
1
𝛼 𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽
𝜏𝑁𝑖,𝑡+𝜏
1+𝜐𝐼−1
𝜏=0
𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽𝜏𝐶𝑡+𝜏
−1 𝑃𝑡+𝜏
𝜃−1𝐾𝑡+𝜏𝑤𝑎,𝑡+𝜏
−(
1−𝛼𝜃
𝛼
)
𝐼−1
𝜏=0
 
 
At the steady state, the re-optimized real wage is constant over time, and so is 
the real wage dispersion. Moreover, the capital to consumption ratio is also 
constant over time. Therefore, letting (𝑊𝑡
∗∗ 𝑃𝑡⁄ )  be the steady state 
re-optimizing real wage, the wage rule implies the following constant steady 
state real wage rule: 
 
(A13)      (
𝑊𝑡
∗∗
𝑃𝑡
)
1−𝜃
= (
𝜃
𝜃 − 1
) [(
𝜀
𝜀 − 1
)
𝑤𝑎
1−𝛼𝜃
(1 − 𝛼)𝐴
]
1
𝛼
(
𝐶
𝐾
) [
𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽
𝜏𝐼−1
𝜏=0
𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽𝜏Π
(𝜃−1)𝜏𝐼−1
𝜏=0
] 𝑁𝑠𝑠
1+𝜐 
 
 
 
 
